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like the common of our city, for example, where thousands of trees might stand without interfering with the public or each other, should not afford specimens of other trees beside the elm? It is a noble tree, perhaps the finest that could be chosen; but the polished foliage of the oak, the light green of the plane-tree and willow, the various forms and shades of the maples, larches, and pines would break the uniformity of the scene, and relieve the eye. Moreover, groups of trees might be scattered here and there to advantage, without injury to the public; for if they should occasionally break the ranks of the train-bands, we apprehend that no serious consequences would endanger the defence of our country. Places for which nature has done much, require the more of man, because they offer him a vantage ground to begin his improvements, and constantly upbraid him if he neglects them.

ART. VI.—*Sir James Mackintosh.*

A General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, chiefly during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By the Right Honorable Sir JAMES MACKINTOSH, LL. D. F. R. S. M. P. 8vo. Philadelphia. 1832.

Since the decease of Stewart, Sir James Mackintosh has been generally considered as the first living writer on Moral Philosophy in the English language. Until the publication of the work before us, his reputation as such had not been justified by any extensive, elaborate or scientific work, and was rather imperfectly sustained by his Introductory Lecture on the Law of Nations, by various anonymous publications in the leading periodical journals, and by the fame of his brilliant and powerful conversation. Political and professional pursuits had probably occupied much of the time which he would otherwise have devoted to what seems to have been through life his favorite study. The present volume will not entirely supply the deficiency which was felt before, and hardly does full justice to his great talents and various learning. It is, however, a very interesting and valuable production. We were preparing to give it the notice to which it is so well entitled by its intrinsic importance and the celebrity of the author, when intelligence was received in this country of his untimely death.

We call it untimely, for although he was somewhat advanced in years, and had nearly reached the ordinary term of human life, his intellectual and literary activity appeared to be constantly increasing. This fact had encouraged the expectation that he was destined to enjoy a protracted, fruitful and glorious old age. The lamented event which has disappointed these hopes augments our interest in the work before us, which now remains the only formal record of his mature opinions upon the most momentous of all subjects. Before we proceed to notice it, it may not be improper to offer a brief sketch of the leading events of his life.

Sir James Mackintosh was born in the small parish of Dorish, in the county of Inverness, in Scotland, on the 24th of October, 1765. His family was a branch of one of the principal Highland clans, and his father, who was a captain in the army, had little to bequeath to him but an honorable name. Through the kindness of some of his relations, who discerned the early promise of his future greatness, he was enabled to pursue the studies necessary to a liberal profession; and in the year 1787, he took the degree of doctor of medicine in the university of Edinburgh. Some of our fellow-citizens, who were then pursuing their studies at that seat of learning, recollect him as a youth of ardent curiosity, wide research, engaging manners and brilliant conversation. Although the necessity of providing for his personal wants had compelled him to choose a profession, the superior attractions of polite literature and philosophy prevented him from studying it with any great earnestness, and it is understood that his attention to medicine was little more than formal. He, however, wrote and submitted to the medical faculty, on taking his degree, a Latin dissertation on muscular action, which was probably his first literary production, and which has since been republished. We are not informed in regard to its merit. Soon after leaving the university, he repaired to London, ostensibly for the purpose of practising as a physician.

It is probable, however, that he had no very serious intention of making the practice of medicine the occupation of his life; for we find him, immediately after his arrival at London, entering with zeal into political controversy. The King, George III., was at that time suffering under his first attack of insanity, and the great question of the day was the Regency.

Mr. Pitt, the minister, maintained that the power of the Prince of Wales as Regent should be strictly limited ; while Fox, the leader of the opposition, and who enjoyed the confidence of the Prince, struggled to obtain for him nearly the whole extent of the Royal prerogative. Mackintosh made his *début* as a political writer, by the publication of a pamphlet in support of the views of Fox. The work attracted very little notice ; and the author, disgusted perhaps at the indifference of the public, turned his thoughts for a time more intently upon his profession. For the purpose of increasing his qualifications for it, he visited Leyden, then the most celebrated medical school in Europe, and afterwards travelled in some other parts of the Netherlands. Soon after his return to London, his father died and bequeathed to him a small landed property in Scotland. Whether in consequence of this change of circumstances, or for some other reason of which we are not informed, he now quitted the profession of medicine, and entered his name as a student of law at Lincoln's Inn ; where, after the usual course of preliminary studies, he was regularly admitted to the bar. In 1789 he married Miss Stuart, a Scottish lady, residing at London, without beauty or fortune,—but of great intelligence and most amiable character.

That year will be forever memorable in the annals of the world, as the one which brought with it the opening of the French Revolution. The public mind in all parts of Europe was agitated by the same causes which produced the crisis in France. Mackintosh, like most other persons of his age, temperament and position in the world, sympathized ardently with the friends of reform, and waited with eager impatience for a suitable opportunity to take the field as a literary combatant on their side. This opportunity was soon afforded by the publication of Edmund Burke's celebrated *Reflections on the French Revolution*. Burke, though he had been through life an ardent, consistent, and doubtless most sincere champion of popular principles of government,—though he had sustained with all his might the cause of this country against the British ministry, during the controversies that preceded our war of Independence,—did not feel himself obliged to patronize Revolution, merely as such, wherever it broke out ;—and looking at that of France by the lights of his long experience, deep learning and admirable sagacity, he thought he saw in it a tendency to anarchy, disorganization and national ruin, rather than

reform and liberty. With him, no opinion was ever adopted in a moderate or half-way form. Having taken up an unfavorable notion of the French Revolution, he thundered it forth to the world in his *Reflections* with a power of reasoning and a splendor of eloquence, which he had never reached before, and which no other political writer has perhaps ever equalled. It was, however, to borrow a figure from Lord Byron,—

—‘A thundergust against the wind.’

The current of public opinion continued for a long time to set with overwhelming force in England, as it did every where else, in favor of the revolution; and the mighty champion who had thrown down the gauntlet on the other side was forthwith met by a host of volunteers of all ages, sexes and characters. The first answer that appeared, was a pamphlet by Mary Wolstonecraft, the renowned advocate of the Rights of Woman. It was on this occasion that Paine published his well-known *Rights of Man*. While preparing that work, Paine heard from a common friend that Mackintosh was also engaged upon an answer to Burke, and is said to have sent him the following polite message:—‘Tell your friend Mackintosh that if he do not make haste, my work against Burke will be published; after which nothing more on that subject will be read.’ Such, however, was the fatuity of the public, that neither the labors of the political stay-maker,—such was the profession of Paine,—nor those of his fair customer, were thought to supersede entirely the necessity of further reply to the terrible *Reflections*. In the spring of 1791, Mackintosh published his answer, under the title of ‘*Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, or a Defence of the French Revolution and its English admirers against the accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, including some strictures on the late production of Mr. De Calonne.’

This work evinces a remarkable degree of talent, although it possesses very little substantial and permanent value. The style is excellent, and distinguished the author immediately as one of the most powerful and elegant writers in the language. In this particular he sustains very well the dangerous comparison with his giant antagonist. To say this, is, of course, to give him the highest praise. As respects the substance, he appears to less advantage. At the present day, when we have all acquired upon this subject the tardy and worthless wisdom which follows

the event, it is but too plain that the combatants are no other than Philip intoxicated and Philip sober. In talents, learning, eloquence, zeal, uprightness of purpose, warmth of heart, they are very well matched; but Mackintosh gives us the frothy effervescence of an immature mind which is still in a state of fermentation, while in Burke we have the pure, ripe, golden, glowing nectar. Mackintosh glances hastily at the surface of society. Burke penetrates the mass, and spreads before us, with unerring truth and sagacity, the principles that hold it together and regulate its internal action. Burke found at the time very little sympathy either among reflecting men or with the body of the people; and even now, although his practical conclusions have been confirmed by the event, and are generally acquiesced in, the public mind has no where,—no, not even in England,—reached the elevation of his theory. If it had, we should not witness the scenes that are now acting on the theatre of Europe. Independently of the feebleness of his general reasoning as compared with that of Burke, the work of Mackintosh was unfortunate in being for the most part a defence of the specific form of government established in France by the States General at the opening of the Revolution. This cobweb constitution, for which the too sanguine friends of liberty had vainly predicted a perennial durability, was swept into nothing the next year; and with it disappeared in a great measure the point and value of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*. In the mean time, however, the work had attracted much attention,—had passed rapidly through three editions, and had rendered the author a person of consequence among those who shared his principles and feelings.

As this work is rather scarce and not likely to be soon republished, we present the following extract as a specimen of its style and principles. The views it expresses in regard to the British Constitution, which the author himself very soon abandoned, have become, within two or three years, by the late singular revolution of feeling in England, almost universal, and have actually led to the adoption of the momentous and once so much derided measure of *Parliamentary Reform*. What their further consequences will be, the history of the next ten years will determine.

* Who can, without indignation, hear the House of Commons of England called a popular representation? A more insolent and

preposterous abuse of language is not to be found in the vocabulary of tyrants. The criterion that distinguishes laws from dictates, freedom from servitude, rightful government from usurpation, the law being an expression of the general will, is wanting.

‘We are boldly challenged to produce our proofs; our complaints are asserted to be chimerical, and the excellence of our government is inferred from its beneficial effects. Most unfortunately for us, most unfortunately for our country, these proofs are too ready and too numerous. We find them in that “monumental debt,” the bequest of wasteful and profligate wars, which already wrings from the peasant something of his hard-earned pittance; which already has punished the industry of the useful and upright manufacturer, by robbing him of the asylum of his house, and the judgment of his peers; to which the madness of political Quixotism adds a million for every farthing that the pomp of ministerial empiricism pays; and which menaces our children with convulsions and calamities, of which no age has seen the parallel. We find them in the black and bloody roll of persecuting statutes that are still suffered to stain our code; a list so execrable, that were no monument to be preserved of what England was in the eighteenth century but her statute book, she might be deemed still plunged into the deepest gloom of superstitious barbarism. We find them in the ignominious exclusion of great bodies of our fellow-citizens from political trusts, by tests which reward falsehood and punish probity, which profane the rights of the religion they pretend to guard, and usurp the dominion of the God they profess to revere. We find them in the growing corruption of those who administer the government,—in the venality of a House of Commons which has become only a cumbrous and expensive chamber for registering ministerial edicts,—in the increase of a nobility arrived to a degradation, by the profusion and prostitution of honors, which the most zealous partisans of democracy would have spared them. We find them, above all, in the rapid progress which has been made to silence the great organ of public opinion, the Press, which is the true control on ministers and parliaments; who might else, with impunity, trample on the impotent formalities that form the pretended bulwark of our freedom. The mutual control, the well-poised balance of the several members of our legislature, are the visions of theoretical, or the pretext of practical politicians. It is a government, not of check, but of conspiracy,—a conspiracy which can only be repressed by the energy of popular opinion.’

At about the same time when Mackintosh was writing his *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, or shortly after, M. de Châteaubriand,

then an exile from his country, also wrote and published at London a work, entitled an *Essay on Revolutions*, which has almost the same general characteristics with the *Vindiciæ*, but is even more extravagant both in substance and style. The similarity between these two productions shows how naturally they resulted from the influence of the existing state of political affairs upon the public mind. The authors of both, under the guidance of the great teacher, Experience, afterwards reformed their political theories, and without going,—as is too often the case with disenchanted enthusiasts,—to the opposite extreme, have sustained through life, in word and in action, the reputation of moderate and yet vigorous, consistent and persevering friends of liberty.

In the case of Mackintosh, the natural operation of Experience in correcting the wild enthusiasm of youth, was aided by the effect of a personal acquaintance with his illustrious opponent. Not long after the publication of the *Vindiciæ*, a person who was desirous to obtain, through the influence of Burke, an employment under Government, prevailed upon Mackintosh to write a letter in his favor to the philosopher of Beaconsfield. Mackintosh, although at that time personally unknown to Burke, executed the task in his powerful and elegant manner. Burke, of course, replied, and a correspondence followed, which ended by an invitation to Mackintosh to visit him at his villa. The proposal was accepted, and after passing a few days and nights in this more than Tusculan retreat, the champion of the French Revolution returned to London, and frankly avowed to his confidential associates, that he was a convert to the opinions of his great antagonist. Few literary documents would be more interesting, than an ample record of the conversations that were held during this visit by these two illustrious friends of liberty and virtue. Instead of the shock between two opposite forms of ignorance and prejudice, which constitutes the staple of most controversies, and can of course end in nothing but mutual exasperation, we should have seen a polite and friendly encounter of men of equal wit and learning, comparing the somewhat various results of an equally honest inquiry, and concluding,—as such comparisons might be generally expected to terminate,—in mutual agreement. Such a work would furnish political and moral lessons, more directly applicable to the exigencies of the present time, than any existing treatise with which we are acquainted.

Unfortunately there are,—so far as we are informed,—no traces of these conversations in existence. The general scope of the argument on both sides may easily be conjectured from the writings of the two parties, and an attempt to throw it into the form of dialogue, in the manner of Plato and Cicero, would furnish a very agreeable employment to any one who loves to exercise his mind upon the noblest objects of meditation and study.

Although Mackintosh adopted at this time the moderate and rational view of liberal principles, to which he adhered through life, he made no public avowal of any change of sentiment, sent in no adhesion to the ruling powers of the day, and received from them no proofs of satisfaction or confidence in the shape of emolument or office. His conversion is therefore entirely free from any suspicion of interested motives. The alteration that had taken place in his opinions was in fact unknown to the public, who continued to class him, as the author of the *Vindiciæ*, with the most violent adherents of the revolutionary party. Hence, when he applied soon after for the use of the great hall of Lincoln's Inn, for the purpose of delivering a course of lectures on the Law of Nations, the society of lawyers, who held the property of the building, refused to grant his request, on the ground that they did not choose to convert their apartment into a theatre for the promulgation of Jacobinism. Even the intercession of Mr. Pitt did not remove the difficulty; and it was not till Lord Loughborough, who, as Chancellor, had some authority in the matter, interfered, that a favorable answer was finally secured.

This course of lectures was fully attended by a most respectable audience, and established the high reputation which the author had acquired for talent and eloquence, while it exhibited him in the light of a more correct and profound thinker than he had shown himself in his previous productions. It is, we believe, substantially the same which he has since delivered in his capacity of Professor of Public Law at the East-India College. The Introductory Lecture was published at the time, and is one of the most valuable and important of his printed works. We cannot doubt, that the whole course will be brought before the world; and if the other Lectures compare at all in merit with the first, the work must become at once the standard and text-book of the great sciences of Natural and National Law.

Mackintosh had been, as we have remarked, admitted to the bar, but whether from disinclination or want of aptitude for the details of legal practice, it does not appear that he was much employed. We hear very little of his exertions in this field, excepting from his defence of Peltier, in the year 1802. Peltier was a French emigrant, who published a newspaper at London, in which he had inserted a pretty severe article upon Bonaparte, then in the freshness of his honors as First Consul. The peace of Amiens had just been concluded, and Bonaparte, not thinking it consistent with the friendly relations between the two countries, that he should be libelled at London, prevailed upon the ministry to bring Peltier to trial. Mackintosh appeared as his advocate, and delivered on the occasion an oration in defence of the liberty of the press, which is certainly one of the most elaborate and finished specimens of modern eloquence. We are not sure, that there is any single speech in the English language, which can fairly be compared with it. The subject was in fact *unique*, and afforded the finest possible scope for the talent of the advocate, who, having been, on the other hand, particularly adapted by his taste and trained by discipline and study to the line of argument which it required, was uncommonly well fitted to do justice to it.

This effort produced a strong impression at the moment in favor of the author's powers. Although it did not effect the acquittal of Peltier, who was too clearly within the scope of the law to escape a verdict, it was highly complimented by the court, and was read with great admiration when it appeared in print. It would probably have introduced Mackintosh into a larger and more lucrative course of practice. In the mean time, however, he found himself without fortune, with a large and increasing family, and of course in circumstances that did not permit him to wait very patiently for the results of the slow progress of his professional fame. Soon after his appearance in this great cause, he accepted the place of Recorder of Bombay,—the first judicial office in that colony,—which promised an ample income and literary leisure, at the cost of expatriation, and too probably, as the event proved, the loss of health. On this occasion, Mackintosh received the honor of Knighthood. He had previously lost his first wife, and espoused, in second nuptials, Miss Allen, of Pembroke, who, with several children, accompanied him on his voyage to the East.

It is not very honorable to the discernment of the govern-

ment, that they should have permitted the expatriation for so many of the best years of his life, of one of the master spirits of the country, whose proper sphere of action was the centre of business at home: and it is much to be regretted, that private considerations rendered it expedient for Sir James to consent to the proposal. While he remained abroad, he discharged his official duties with great distinction, and contributed, by his high intellectual and moral qualities, to elevate the standard of civilization in the remote colony where he resided. He founded a literary society at Bombay, as Sir William Jones had done at Calcutta; but did not engage with the same ardor in the study of the oriental languages and literature, with which his acquaintance was very limited. After a residence in India of about ten years, he found his health impaired by the effect of the climate, and returned to England with his fortune very little if at all improved, and with a liver complaint which adhered to him for the rest of his life, and finally conducted him to an untimely grave.

Soon after his return to England, Sir James was placed in parliament for one of the nomination boroughs, and was regularly returned to every succeeding parliament for the rest of his life. These boroughs, however irregular in principle, were practically a very convenient method of securing to the public the services of many of the best qualified men, who would otherwise have found it difficult to obtain a seat. In parliament he acted uniformly with the whigs on the great points of foreign and domestic policy, such as Catholic Emancipation, Parliamentary Reform, and the like; but always professed their principles in a moderate and judicious shape. On the questions connected with neutral rights, which grew out of the relations between Great Britain and this country, he co-operated actively and ably with his friend, Mr. Brougham, in support of the liberal side. After the close of the war, he took occasion, in one of his speeches in the House of Commons, to compliment the American commissioners at Ghent, upon their 'astonishing superiority' over their opponents. In other speeches and in his writings, he has often spoken in friendly and favorable terms of this country. This candid,—perhaps partial disposition, in one whose opinion was authority, coming into contrast as it did with the meanness and illiberality of many of his contemporaries, had so much endeared the name of Sir James Mackintosh to our citizens, that he was generally

styled in the newspapers whenever he was mentioned, *the friend of America*. A report, which was spread soon after the entrance into power of the present ministry, that he was coming out to reside among us as British minister, was heard with much satisfaction, and there cannot be a doubt that his reception would have been of the most gratifying character. We are not informed whether there was any foundation for this report, but at this time his health was probably too much impaired to admit of his encountering the trials of a long voyage and a new climate.

The questions upon which he spoke in parliament most frequently were those of foreign policy and international law. His eloquence was of a dignified, manly and imposing character. His manner was not particularly graceful, and he had a slight Scotch accent; but his language was flowing, copious, energetic and elegant, and above all carried with it to the minds of his hearers the rich gifts of profound and original thought. The delightful combination of philosophy and taste was exhibited by Mackintosh in higher perfection than it had been by any parliamentary orator since the time of Burke, not excepting even Canning, who yet exemplified it in a very remarkable degree. The eloquence of Sir James was far more finished than that of Brougham, although the latter, from his superior activity and industry, possessed a greater share of political influence, and has finally made a much more brilliant fortune in the world. Sir James, however, had the state of his health permitted, would have probably been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Lord Grey, and after having been nailed for much of his life to the north wall of opposition, and suffered a good deal from pecuniary embarrassments, would have found the evening of his days gilded and cheered with the southern sun of power and fortune. This was denied him, and the only temporal reward which he received for his labors and studies was a great but dowerless fame. It is indeed rather lamentable that in a country where jobs and pensions were quite à *l'ordre du jour*, there should have been found no employment that could afford a competency at home to a person whose genius was an honor to the age, and with the advantage of an easier position in the world would have enabled him to realize more completely than perhaps any of the moderns have yet done, the beautiful union of talents, virtues and graces, that distinguished the character of the

illustrious Roman orator, to which his own bore in its leading traits a marked resemblance.

His passionate devotion to letters undoubtedly co-operated with the feeble state of his health, after his return to Europe, to diminish his professional and political activity. He projected early in life a great work on the history of his country, and collected materials with much assiduity, but does not appear to have commenced the execution of the task until a short time before his death. He then undertook an abridgement of the history of England, for the Cabinet Cyclopædia, of which he afterwards extended the plan, so that, had he finished it, it would probably have furnished a pretty complete account of the period subsequent to the Revolution of 1688. Unfortunately he lived to publish only two volumes, and to prepare a third, which he is said to have left in manuscript, making less than half of the entire work, which would have reached to eight. These three volumes, with the work before us and a life of Sir Thomas More, constitute, we believe, in addition to those which we have already mentioned, the whole of his acknowledged productions. They form a scanty product for so long and careful a cultivation of so rich a soil. It is understood, that Sir James was also the author of some of the best articles in the *Edinburgh Review*. His writings, whether fugitive or studied, are uniformly distinguished by original thought, and a noble and elegant flow of language. Even his private letters, some of which have crept into print, have the air of finished compositions. We trust that measures will be taken immediately for collecting the whole of his works, acknowledged or anonymous, with such of his manuscripts as are in a state for publication, and as large an amount of his correspondence as can be procured. In the mean time, we learn with pleasure that it is intended by some of our own booksellers to publish immediately a selection from his works in this city.

Although Sir James possessed a great aptitude and talent for literary composition, it is understood, notwithstanding, that the intellectual exercise in which he most delighted was conversation. This was probably the field in which he exhibited his fine powers and various learning with more satisfaction to himself than in any other; and it must be owned, that for those who are capable of it, the pleasure of animated and intellectual conversation is hardly inferior to the high excitement of public speaking, and very far beyond the solitary delights of the pen.

Sir James was regarded, by the elevated and brilliant circle with which he was connected, as the great living master of moral and political philosophy ; and delivered his oracles at the dinner table or in the fashionable saloon, with the authority, and nearly the power, but without the rudeness of the great moralist of the preceding generation, whose savage deportment excluded him from polished society.* Sir James was remark-

* The writer of this article had the honor of a personal introduction to Sir James Mackintosh, while on a visit to London, in the year 1817, and, during that and some other subsequent visits, enjoyed a good deal of his society. He was much struck with the copiousness, elegance, originality and point of Sir James's conversation, and made a memorandum, at the time, of a few of his remarks, which, with some omissions, is here inserted.

'Shakspeare, Milton, Locke and Newton, are four names beyond competition superior to any that the continent can put against them.—It was a proof of singular and very graceful modesty in Gray, that after bestowing upon Shakspeare a high eulogium in the Progress of Poetry, he did not, when proceeding to the character of Milton, rashly decide upon their relative merit. Every half-read critic affirms at once, according to his peculiar taste or the caprice of the moment, that one or the other is the superior poet ; but when Gray comes to Milton, he only says,—

“ Nor second he that rode sublime
Upon the seraph wings of ecstasy.”

'Dryden he assigns to an inferior class,—

“ Behold where Dryden's less presumptuous car,
Wide o'er the fields of glory bear
Two coursers of inferior race,” &c.'

The writer observed that the German critics call Dryden a man walking upon stilts in a marsh.—*Sir James*—‘Depend upon it, they do not understand the language.—Shakspeare's great superiority over other writers consists in his deep knowledge of human nature. Châteaubriand says of him, ‘*Il a souvent des mots terribles.*’ It has been thought by some that those observations upon human nature which appear so profound and remarkable, may, after all, lie nearest to the surface, and be taken up most naturally by the early writers in every language ; but we do not find them in Homer. Homer is the finest ballad writer in any language. The flow and fullness of his style is beautiful ; but he has nothing of the deep, piercing observation of Shakspeare.’

The writer mentioned that he had been at St. Paul's, and spoke of the statues of Johnson, Sir William Jones, and others that he had seen there. *Sir James*—‘It is a noble edifice, to be sure, and we have some great men there ; but it would be too much to expect that the glory of the second temple should equal that of the first. One country is not sufficient for two such repositories as Westminster Abbey.—Boswell's Life of Johnson has given a wrong impression of him in

able, on the contrary, for the affability and ease of his manners. His moral qualities corresponded very well with the elevation of his intellectual character. His feelings were naturally lofty and generous. He drew from his own consciousness that

some respects. When we see four large volumes written upon a man's conversation, through a period of forty years, and his remarks alone set down, of all those made at the time, we naturally take the idea that Johnson was the central point of society for all that period. The truth is, he never was in good society; at least in those circles where men of letters mix with the fashionable world. His brutal, intolerant manners excluded him from it, of course. He met good society, to be sure, at the Literary Club and at Sir Joshua Reynolds's.—Gibbon was asked why he did not talk more in the presence of Dr. Johnson. "Sir," replied the historian, taking a pinch of snuff, "I have no pretensions to the ability of contending with Dr. Johnson in brutality and insolence."

'Sir William Jones was not a man of first-rate talent,—he had great facility of acquisition, but not a mind of the highest order. Reason and imagination are the two great intellectual faculties, and he was certainly not pre-eminent in either. His poetry is indifferent, and his other writings are agreeable, but not profound. He was, however, a most amiable and excellent man.'

Speaking of the poets of the day, Sir James observed,—'I very much doubt whether Scott will survive long. Hitherto nothing has stood the test of time, but labored and finished verse, and of this Scott has none. If I were to say which of the poets of the day is most likely to be read hereafter, I should give my opinion in favor of some of Campbell's poems. Scott, however, has a wonderful fertility and vivacity.' It may be proper to add that the allusion is here exclusively to the poetry of Scott. The Waverley novels were not generally attributed to him at the time when the remark was made.

'Rogers's Pleasures of Memory has one good line,—

"The only pleasures we can call our own."

It is remarkable that this poem is very popular. A new edition of it is printed every year. It brings the author in about 200*l.* per annum, and yet its principal merit is its finished, perfect versification, which one would think the people could hardly enjoy. The subject, however, recommends itself very much to all classes of readers.'

The writer commended highly the language of Sir William Scott's opinions. Sir James—'There is a little too much elegance for judicial *dicta*, and a little unfairness in always attempting to found the judgment upon the circumstances of the case, perhaps slight ones, rather than general principles. Sir William is one of the most entertaining men to be met with in society. His style is by no means so pure and classical as that of Blackstone, which is one of the finest models in the English language. Middleton and he are the two best in their way of the writers of their period. Middleton's Free Inquiry is an instance of great prudence and moderation in drawing conclusions respecting particular facts from general principles.

conviction of the reality of benevolent sentiments, which, as we shall presently see, he has so well expressed in the work before us. He wanted the restless activity which prompts some men to constant exertion, and the steady prudence which

His premises would have carried him much further than he has gone. There are many fine passages in his *Life of Cicero*.'

Sir James said that he had received from Mr. Wortman a collection of specimens of American eloquence, and that Mr. Wortman had given it as his opinion, that the faculty of eloquence was more general in America than in England, though some individual Englishmen might perhaps possess it in a higher degree. The writer remarked that he thought our best orators but little inferior to the best orators of the present day in England; and mentioned Mr. Otis, Mr. Randolph, and Mr. Pinkney. Sir James—'I have not seen any of Mr. Otis's speeches. I have read some of Randolph's, but the effect must depend very much on the manner. There is a good deal of vulgar finery. Malice there is, too, but that would be excusable, provided it were in good taste.—

'Mr. Adams's Defence of the Constitution is not a first-rate work. He lays too much stress upon the examples of small and insignificant States, and looks too much at the external form of governments, which is, in general, a very indifferent criterion of their character. His fundamental principle of securing government, by a balance of power between two houses and an executive, does not strike me as very just or important. It is a mere puerility to suppose that three branches, and no more nor less, are essential to political salvation. In this country, where there are nominally three branches, the real sovereignty resides in the House of Commons. Two branches are no doubt expedient, as far as they induce deliberation and mature judgment on the measures proposed.'

The writer mentioned Mr. Adams's opinion, (as expressed in a letter to Dr. Price) that the French Revolution failed because the legislative body consisted of one branch, and not two. Sir James—'That circumstance may have precipitated matters a little, but the degraded situation of the *Tiers Etat* was the principal cause of the failure. The entire separation in society between the *noblesse* and the professions destroyed the respectability of the latter, and deprived them in a great degree of popular confidence. In England, eminent and successful professional men rise to an equality in importance and rank with the first nobles, take by much the larger share in the government, and bring with them to it the confidence of the people. This will forever prevent any popular revolution in the country.—The *Federalist* is a well written work.—

'The remarkable private morality of the New England States is worth attention, especially when taken in connexion with the very moral character of the poorer people in Scotland, Holland and Switzerland. It is rather singular that all these countries, which are more moral than any others, are precisely those in which *Calvinism* is predominant.' The writer mentioned that Boston and Cambridge had in a great measure abandoned Calvinism. Sir James—'I am rather surprised at that;

leads them to husband regularly, with strict economy, the fruits of their labors. Had he combined these humbler virtues with his higher endowments, his lot in life would have probably been somewhat different. It was, however, a sufficiently

but the same thing has happened in other places similarly situated. Boston, Geneva and Edinburgh might once have been considered as the three high places of Calvinism, and the enemy is now, it seems, in full possession of them all. The fact appears to be a consequence of the principle of reaction, which operates as universally in the moral as in the physical world.—Jonathan Edwards was a man of great merit. His *Treatise on the Will* is a most profound and acute disquisition. The English Calvinists have produced nothing to be put in competition with it. He was one of the greatest men who have owned the authority of Calvin, and there have been a great many. Calvin himself had a very strong and acute mind.—Sir Henry Vane was one of the most profound minds that ever existed, not inferior, perhaps, to Bacon. Milton has a fine sonnet addressed to him,—

“Vane, young in years, in sage experience old.”

His works, which are theological, are extremely rare, and display astonishing powers. They are remarkable as containing the first direct assertion of the liberty of conscience. He was put to death in a most perfidious manner. I am proud, as a friend of liberty, and as an Englishman, of the men that resisted the tyranny of Charles I. Even when they went to excess, and put to death the king, they did it in a much more decorous manner than their imitators in France. Thomson says of them, with great justice, in his florid way,—

“First at thy call, her age of men effulged,” &c.

‘Eloquence is the power of gaining your purpose by words. All the labored definitions of it to be found in the different rhetorical works amount in substance to this. It does not, therefore, require or admit the strained and false ornaments that are taken for it by some. I hate these artificial flowers without fragrance or fitness. Nobody ever succeeded in this way but Burke. Fox used to say, “I cannot bear this thing in any body but Burke, and he cannot help it. It is his natural manner.”—Sir Francis Burdett is one of the best of our speakers, take him altogether, voice, figure and manner. His voice is the best that can be imagined. As to his matter, he certainly speaks above his mind. He is not a man of very superior talents, though respectable.—Plunkett, if he had come earlier into Parliament, so as to have learned the trade, would probably have excelled all our orators. He and counsellor Phillips (or O’Garnish, as he is nicknamed here,) are at the opposite points of the scale. O’Garnish’s style is pitiful to the last degree. He ought by common consent to be driven from the bar.—Mr. Wilberforce’s voice is beautiful; his manner mild and perfectly natural. He has no artificial ornament; but an easy, natural image occasionally springs up in his mind that pleases very much.—Cicero’s orations are a good deal in the flowery, artificial manner, though the best specimens in their way. We

enviable one. He ranked with the highest class of England's intellectual peerage, and possessed the richest of all treasures in a heart overflowing with benevolent affections. Without affectation or fanaticism, he was sincerely and deeply religious. If there be,—as we all believe and hope,—another and a better world, where the wise and good repose together from the troubles of this, we cannot doubt that Mackintosh is now among its favored tenants,—enjoying the communion of the high and gifted minds whom he always so much loved and admired, the Platos, the Stewarts, the Burkes, the Ciceros, —and dwelling in the nearer presence of that Sublime Spirit, whose ineffable glories he has so eloquently though faintly shadowed forth in so many splendid passages of his writings. If his friends lament the change, it must be for their sakes, and not for his.

‘ If that high world that lies beyond
 Our own, *surviving Love endears*,
 If there the cherished heart be fond,
 The eye the same, excepting tears,
 How welcome those untrodden spheres !
 How sweet this very hour to die !
 To soar from earth, and find all fears
 Lost in thy light, Eternity !’

Having taken this hasty survey of the political and literary

tire in reading them. Cicero, though a much greater man than Demosthenes, take him altogether, was inferior to him as an orator. To be the second orator the world has produced is, however, praise enough.—Pascal was a prodigy. His *Pensées* are wonderfully profound and acute. Though predicated on his peculiar way of thinking, they are not on that account to be condemned. I dislike the illiberality of some of my liberal friends, who will not allow any merit to any thing that does not agree with their own point of view. Making allowance for Pascal's way of looking at things, and expressing himself, his ideas are prodigiously deep and correct.—Most of the apparent absurdities in theology and metaphysics are important truths, exaggerated and disfigured by an incorrect manner of understanding or expressing them ; as, for instance, the doctrines of transubstantiation and of total depravity.—Jacob Bryant was a miserable writer, though for particular purposes it was thought expedient at one time to sustain his reputation. He was guilty of a gross absurdity in attempting such a work as his principal one without any oriental learning, which he did not even profess. Yet Sir William Jones called him the principal writer of his time. This opinion quite takes away the value of Sir William's critical judgment.’

career of Sir James Mackintosh, we proceed to notice in the concise form which alone the space remaining to us will now permit, the work before us.

The first question in the theory of Ethics, is that which arises between those who admit, and those who deny the reality of moral distinctions. This was almost the only one agitated in the ancient schools of philosophy. Socrates, who is known to us by the charming dialogues of Plato and Xenophon, assumed the reality of virtue and illustrated its beauty, without engaging in any metaphysical speculations upon its nature. The Stoics, with some variations of form, pursued substantially the same course. Epicurus, on the other hand, denied the reality of virtue, and placed the only principle of action in pleasure. His followers in modern times, from Gassendi and Hobbes to Bentham, have professed the same theory. With them there is of course no question about the nature of a distinction, which they do not believe to exist. To those who admit the reality of moral distinctions, the further questions arise, In what do they consist; and by what faculties do we take cognizance of them? A correct solution of these questions would furnish the leading points in the theory of morals. None has yet been offered which has commanded the general assent of enlightened men; and strange as it may seem, the theory of this first and most important of all the sciences is yet unsettled. The history of Ethical Philosophy is therefore the history of the attempts which have been made,—thus far without success,—to solve the great problems alluded to above.

In the work before us, which was prepared as a preliminary dissertation to one of the volumes of the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*, Sir James Mackintosh begins by briefly stating, in two introductory chapters, the objects of Ethical Science and the difficulties that are encountered in the prosecution of it. He then, in two more chapters, takes a hasty retrospect of the history of the Ethical Philosophy of the ancients and of the moderns, after which, he proceeds to the principal subject of the work, which is the history of philosophy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The subject divides itself into three principal parts.

1. The revival of the Epicurean doctrine by Hobbes and his followers, of whom the principal were Hume, the French metaphysicians, and Bentham.

2. The attempt of Cudworth and Clarke to found the reali-

ty of moral distinctions on a natural *fitness of things* cognizable by the understanding; and,

3. The attempts of various philosophers, from Shaftesbury to Stewart, including particularly Hutcheson and Butler, to prove the existence of a *moral sense* or feeling, by which we naturally and without any exercise of the understanding distinguish the right and wrong of actions, as we distinguish colors by the eye, and sounds by the ear.

The most natural mode of arranging the matter would perhaps have been to class together the writers who have respectively favored each of these different systems. Sir James has however not adopted this method, but has followed a strictly chronological one, beginning with Hobbes, and taking up the following writers in the order of time in which they wrote, without regard to their opinions. At the close of his summary of the opinions of each of the principal writers, he annexes his own observations on them, under the head of *Remarks*. In these remarks, he states and concisely develops a theory upon the general principles of Ethical Philosophy, which, if not entirely original, has never been proposed before in precisely the same form. The work bears throughout the marks of hasty preparation, and is no doubt chargeable with great deficiencies. The most remarkable of these is the absence of any notice of the ethical theories of the modern Germans, for which Sir James apologises on the ground of want of time and room. Probably his acquaintance with this branch of the subject was hardly sufficient to have enabled him to treat it satisfactorily to himself or the public. The omission is, however, fatal to the value of the work as a complete treatise, since the German branch of the subject is unquestionably the most important of all. The French writers are also passed over almost without notice. The work is, in fact, a view of the progress of Philosophy in England, and does not include a more copious notice of foreigners than would probably have been introduced, had it been professedly confined to the author's country. This would perhaps have been the fairer and more judicious course. Even when considered as thus limited, the subject is still treated in a very concise way, the work being, as it is entitled, merely a general view.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, it will be read with deep interest by students of moral science, and by all who take an interest in the higher departments of intellectual research, or enjoy the beauties of elegant language applied to the illustra-

tion of 'divine philosophy.' It gives us, on an important branch of the most important of the sciences, the reflections of one of the few master minds, that are fitted by original capacity and patient study to probe it to the bottom. It is highly interesting, whether we agree with him or not, to know the opinions of such a man upon the character of the principal ethical writers and upon the leading principles of the science. These opinions are exhibited with every advantage of language and manner. It is difficult to imagine how the union of power, dignity and grace, which may be supposed to constitute a finished style, can be carried further than it is in the writings of Sir James Mackintosh. The moral tone is also of the purest and most agreeable kind. The work breathes throughout a temperate enthusiasm in the cause of humanity, and a spirit of perfect toleration for opposite opinions, even of an exceptionable cast. The author asserts the reality of benevolent affections, and proves their existence in his own heart by exercising charity towards those who differ from him even on vital questions. He condemns the heresy, but gives the heretic full credit, as far as it seems to be deserved, for sincerity and talents. He exercises also the—if possible—still more rare and difficult justice of a full, manly and generous acknowledgment of kindred merit in others. He does not labor under the impression, so natural to ambitious mediocrity, that every word of praise bestowed upon another, is a leaf of laurel torn from his own garland. He enlarges with an overflowing fullness of heart, we may say, even to exaggeration, upon the merits of contemporaries. Under the influence of this generous and amiable impulse, he has probably overrated the deserts of Bentham, Brown and Stewart. But how much more noble is an error of this kind, than the petty jealousy which can see nothing in living excellence of any kind but an object of attack, as the wasp approaches the fairest fruits only for the purpose of piercing them to the core! It is indeed refreshing and delightful, to find one of the most powerful minds of the age uniting the best feelings with the highest gifts of intellect, and exemplifying in his own person the moral graces which he undertakes to teach. Such examples justify the more honorable view of human nature, and prove that the selfish and vicious, who habitually deny the reality of benevolence and virtue, draw a false general conclusion from their own individual case; forgetting that their consciousness gives them no authority except to 'speak for themselves.'

The form of the work is, therefore, such as will recommend it very strongly to the general reader, and will render it a useful and delightful study even to those who habitually take no interest in metaphysical researches. In the few observations which we propose to add upon the substance, we shall first notice some of the remarks of the author upon the theories of other writers, and conclude by a brief examination of his own.

In entering on the field of inquiry which properly belongs to his subject, Sir James encounters at the threshold the startling paradoxes of the well-known philosopher of Malmesbury, Hobbes.—If the works of writers of eminence were examined with reference to their personal history, it would probably be found that their peculiarities, whether of style or doctrine, are,—more frequently than we should perhaps imagine,—the results, in one form or another, of their own personal experience, and are of course very much colored by the circumstances under which they happened to live. The philosophy of Hobbes seems to have been a reaction against the wild excesses of the popular revolution that occurred in England in the seventeenth century. Alarmed at the horrors that were perpetrated by his countrymen as soon as they had shaken off the restraint of royal authority, Hobbes embraced the idea that the law, as proclaimed by government, is the only source of moral distinctions. If it be right to pay a debt, and wrong to commit murder, it is, according to Hobbes, only because one of these actions is commanded and the other prohibited by law. The disgust which he felt at the political forms under which the excesses of the Commonwealth had been committed, produced in his mind a preference for absolute monarchy, which was his system in politics; and the fanatical fury of the British reformers led him to adopt the notion that religion, as well as morals, ought to be entirely under the control of government. He denied the reality of benevolent affections, and considered personal pleasure or advantage as the only imaginable motive of action. Such were the leading points of his theory, which he proclaimed with a confidence that arrested the public attention, and an elegance of language that enlisted the public taste on his side. The style of Hobbes is thus characterized by our author.

‘A permanent foundation of his fame consists in his admirable style, which seems to be the very perfection of didactic language. Short, clear, precise, pithy, his language never has more than

one meaning, which it never requires a second thought to find. By the help of his exact method, it takes so firm a hold on the mind, that it will not allow attention to slacken. His little tract on *Human Nature* has scarcely an ambiguous or a needless word. He has so great a power of always choosing the most significant term, that he never is reduced to the poor expedient of using many in its stead. He had so thoroughly studied the genius of the language, and knew so well how to steer between pedantry and vulgarity, that two centuries have not superannuated probably more than a dozen of his words. His expressions are so luminous, that he is clear without the help of illustration. Perhaps no writer of any age or nation, on subjects so abstruse, has manifested an equal power of engraving his thoughts on the minds of his readers. He seems never to have taken a word for ornament or pleasure; and he deals with eloquence and poetry, as the natural philosopher who explains the mechanism of children's toys, or deigns to contrive them. Yet his style so stimulates attention, that it never tires; and to those who are acquainted with the subject, appears to have as much spirit as can be safely blended with reason. He compresses his thoughts so unaffectedly, and yet so tersely, as to produce occasionally maxims which excite the same agreeable surprise with wit, and have become a sort of philosophical proverbs; the success of which he partly owed to the suitableness of such forms of expression to his dictatorial nature. His words have such an appearance of springing from his thoughts, as to impress on the reader a strong opinion of his originality, and indeed to prove that he was not conscious of borrowing; though conversation with Gassendi must have influenced his mind; and it is hard to believe that his coincidence with Ockham should have been purely accidental, on points so important as the denial of general ideas, the reference of moral distinctions to superior power, and the absolute thralldom of religion under the civil power, which he seems to have thought necessary, to maintain that independence of the state on the church with which Ockham had been contented.'

The tremendous paradoxes of Hobbes excited a strong sensation throughout Europe, and have given occasion, directly or indirectly, to most of the works that have since appeared on Ethical Science. Sir Robert Filmer, Harrington, Clarendon, Bishop Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Baxter and Hutcheson, all undertook to refute him with different weapons, and for different immediate purposes. The great work of Cudworth, entitled the *Intellectual System*, was written as an answer to Hobbes, but it was directed against his

theological and metaphysical, rather than his ethical theories. The notions of Cudworth on the last subject were explained in several essays which he left in manuscript, and of which one only, the *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, has been published. The rest (not much to the credit of British taste and liberality) are still locked up in the repositories of the British museum. In the *Immutable Morality*, Cudworth gives the introduction only to his ethical system, in which he describes the distinction between right and wrong, as inherent in nature, and independent of any power whether human or divine. 'The distinction of right from wrong is discerned by reason; and as soon as these words are defined, it becomes evident that it would be a contradiction in terms to affirm that any power, human or divine, could change their nature, or in other words make the same act just and unjust, at the same time. They had existed eternally in the only mode in which truths can be said to be eternal, in the *Eternal Mind*, and they are indestructible and unchangeable, like that superior intelligence.'

The system of Clarke seems to be substantially the same with that of Cudworth, as far as we can judge of the latter from the imperfect development of it in the *Immutable Morality*. Clarke maintains that the law of nature consists of the relations established by nature among the individual beings composing the universe, and that human actions are right or wrong, accordingly as they conform to or disagree with these relations. Thus the relation existing by nature between parents and children is that of love, or in other words, parents naturally love their children and children their parents. A conduct conformable to this relation is right, and one opposed to it is wrong. The ideas of the relations which constitute the law of nature, existed eternally in the *Divine Mind*. God, for example, foreknew from eternity that the relation of love would naturally exist between parents and children, whenever the human race should be created. There is therefore an original and eternal *fitness* in a conduct conformable to this relation. This fitness creates an *obligation* independent of the will of God, or of the effect of the action upon the welfare either of the agent or of the public. Reason acknowledges the obligation, and decides that there is the same absurdity in an action which contradicts this natural *fitness of things*, as there is in a proposition that contradicts the ordinary relations of numbers, or the evidence of the senses.

Such appears to be the general outline of the theory of Clarke ; and so far as it assumes that the essential characteristic of virtue is conformity to the law of nature, we consider him as stating a true and important principle. Sir James Mackintosh takes exception to this doctrine. 'The murderer,' he observes, 'who poisons by arsenic, acts agreeably to his knowledge of the power of that substance to kill, which is a relation between two things, as much as the physician, who employs an emetic after the poison, acts upon the belief of the tendency of that remedy to preserve life, which is another relation between two things.' With submission to Sir James's authority, we must needs say, that this objection appears to us to be but little better than a quibble. The murderer takes away life ; the physician preserves it. The question is, whether their acts are respectively conformable or opposed to the relation naturally existing between the agent and the person acted on. Whether they conform to or contradict other relations between other persons or things, such as that between certain mineral substances and the human stomach, is entirely foreign to the purpose, or rather is a wholly absurd inquiry which admits of no answer. It might be argued with more plausibility, that the murderer, or in general any person who commits an immoral action, must act under the influence of some motive, which is of course the result of some of the natural relations in which he is placed ; and that if he violates one law he obeys another. If, for example, I steal the property of my neighbor, in order to increase my own personal gratifications, I obey the law of nature, which leads me to seek my personal gratifications ; and the act, though immoral, is still conformable to a law of my nature. But the ready answer to this is, that the action, so far as it conforms to the law of nature, is not vicious. Considered merely as an attempt to increase my own personal gratifications, its character is innocent. The immorality lies in doing this at the expense of the happiness of another, and the action, considered in its operation upon the happiness of this other person,—under which view alone it is immoral,—does violate the law of nature which has established among men the relation of society, and the kindly feelings that belong to it.

The main principle of Clarke, viz.—that the essential characteristic of virtue is conformity to the law of nature, seems to us, therefore, substantially correct as well as highly important, and it is, as we conceive, not affected by the objections of

Sir James Mackintosh. The other part of the theory of Clarke, viz. that the obligation to obey the law of nature results from the fact that the ideas of the relations which compose it have existed from all eternity in the mind of the Deity, seems to us to be much less plausible. We see not why we are bound to obey a law because it was foreseen by God, before such a law existed, that it would exist at a future period. The divine foreknowledge of the law of nature,—which we of course believe as a fact,—has nothing to do with the obligation we are under to obey this law. We are bound to obey the law of nature, not because the Deity foresaw, but because he established it. Every being, animate or inanimate, physical or moral, must of necessity obey the law of its nature ; that is, it must exist and act in the way in which God intended that it should exist and act, and not in any other. The necessity of obeying the physical laws of nature is physical and absolute ; that of obeying the moral laws of nature is simply moral. We have the physical power of violating them ; but even while we are in the act of doing this, the law still retains its empire over us, and punishes us for the act we are committing, by inflicting upon us the painful feelings, that are by the will of Providence naturally connected with the violation of it. The will of God is, therefore, the real source of moral obligation.

Sir James Mackintosh, in several passages of the work before us, denies this principle as maintained by some preceding writers, and appears to regard it as of a dangerous and even irreligious character. ‘The doctrine of Ockham,’ he observes, in allusion to this principle, ‘which by necessary implication refuses moral attributes to the Deity, and contradicts the existence of a moral government, is practically equivalent to atheism. As all devotional feelings have moral qualities for their sole object ; as no being can inspire love or reverence otherwise than by those qualities which are naturally amiable and venerable, this doctrine would, if men were consistent, extinguish piety, or, in other words, annihilate religion. Yet so astonishing are the contradictions of human nature, that this *most impious of all opinions* probably originated in a pious solicitude to magnify the sovereignty of God, and to exalt his authority even above his own goodness. Hence we may understand its adoption by John Gerson, the Oracle of the Council of Constance, and the great opponent of the

spiritual monarchy of the Pope, a pious mystic, who placed religion in devout feeling.' Sir James Mackintosh elsewhere describes the same principle as a *monstrous position* and *the most pernicious of all moral heresies*. It is remarkable that he applies to an opinion which, whatever he may have supposed to be implied in it, is at least apparently respectful to religion, and which has been and is entertained by the most learned and pious men, a more severe censure than he has any where bestowed upon avowed atheism.

The feeling that prompted these remarks seems to have been excited by the injudicious manner, in which some writers have attempted to illustrate the doctrine in question. Ockham, for example, as quoted by Sir James, affirms that 'if God had commanded his creatures to hate himself, the hatred of God would be the duty of man.' This no doubt is revolting enough: but the error lies in the supposition of fact, which is incoherent and absurd. The principle implied, that it is the duty of man to do the will of God, instead of being, as Sir James represents it, a monstrous position, is one of the most familiar truisms of natural and revealed religion. It is evident, in fact, that there are only two possible suppositions in regard to the economy of the universe; one, that it exists *of necessity* as it is, which is atheism; the other, that it is the work of a Supreme Intelligent Principle. If the latter be true,—as we all believe,—then it is not less evident that the laws which regulate the movements and actions of the beings composing this universe, and which we commonly call the *law of nature*, are merely an expression of the will of God. When Sir James tells us that 'the relations of things, though conceived by the Eternal Mind, are, if such inadequate language may be pardoned, the law of his will as well as the model of his works,' we must be permitted to say that his language, though certainly not so intended by its illustrious author, is not merely inadequate, but irreverent and absurd; obnoxious in fact to the precise objection which he makes himself to the opposite opinion, to wit, that it is equivalent to atheism. To say that the relations of things as they now exist were a law to the will of God, is to say, in other words, that God was under the *necessity* of creating the universe in the form in which it now exists, and in no other. But if the universe exist of necessity as it is, the intervention of a Supreme Intelligent Principle as its Creator,

Lawgiver, and Preserver, becomes superfluous, and in good philosophy cannot be admitted. The supposition is therefore, as we have said, equivalent to atheism.

We shall not at present enlarge upon this subject, which is of too transcendent and sacred a character to be treated cursorily in connexion with other topics. The question lies at the bottom of Ethics, and though satisfactorily answered in general terms by various writers, has not yet, we think, been thoroughly examined and illustrated in a scientific way. An inquiry into it, conducted in a proper spirit and with the necessary talent and research, would tend very strongly to settle the now disputed foundations of the theory of morals.

The system of Clarke, which places the essence of virtue in conformity to the law of nature,—supposing it to be correct, which Sir James denies,—is yet, as he justly remarks, defective and incomplete, inasmuch as it omits entirely the consideration of *feeling*. The existence of *moral sentiments* is one of the most certain and obvious facts in our constitution; and these must be explained and accounted for in every complete and consistent ethical system. The deficiency of Clarke and his followers in this respect was supplied by Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson, and the subsequent writers who maintain the theory of a *moral sense*,—a term which was first introduced by Hutcheson. This theory supposes the existence of a distinct faculty, entirely independent of the understanding or the affections, by which we recognize moral distinctions. Sir James adopts this supposition under a form in some degree peculiar to himself, upon which we shall presently make some remarks. Our limits will not permit us to follow him in detail through his commentaries on all the writers alluded to. They will be found uniformly instructive and entertaining.

Of President Edwards he speaks in the following terms.

‘This remarkable man, the metaphysician of America, was formed among the Calvinists of New England, when their stern doctrine retained its rigorous authority. His power of subtle argument, perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed among men, was joined, as in some of the ancient Mystics, with a character which raised his piety to fervor. He embraced their doctrine, probably without knowing it to be theirs. “True religion,” says he, “in a great measure consists in holy affections. A love of divine things, for the beauty and sweetness of their moral

excellency, is the spring of all holy affections." Had he suffered this noble principle to take the right road to all its fair consequences, he would have entirely concurred with Plato, with Shaftesbury, and Malebranche, in devotion to "the first good, first perfect, and first fair."

The passage here quoted from Edwards seems to have made a deep impression upon Sir James's mind. We remember to have heard him cite it in conversation, with the strongest expressions of approbation. It is certainly one of the most eloquent and beautiful enunciations of religious truth to be found in the language. In general the style of Edwards is uncommonly good, and when his subject affords opportunity for the display of such qualities, will be found to be in a high degree impressive and eloquent. His merit in this respect is, we incline to think, not generally appreciated at the present day in this country. We should regard it as one symptom of a favorable change in the public taste, to learn that his works were more generally read, and more highly valued than they are now.

Berkeley, the good and great Bishop of Cloyne, is a particular favorite of our author, who commences his account of him in the following terms.

'This great metaphysician was so little a moralist, that it requires the attraction of his name to excuse its introduction here. His *Theory of Vision* contains a great discovery in mental philosophy. His immaterialism is chiefly valuable as a touchstone of metaphysical sagacity; showing those to be altogether without it, who, like Johnson and Beattie, believed that his speculations were sceptical, that they implied any distrust in the senses, or that they had the smallest tendency to disturb reasoning or alter conduct. Ancient learning, exact science, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn and enrich the mind of this accomplished man. All his contemporaries agreed with the satirist in ascribing

"To Berkeley every virtue under heaven.'

Adverse factions and hostile wits concurred only in loving, admiring, and contributing to advance him. The severe sense of Swift endured his visions; the modest Addison endeavored to reconcile Clarke to his ambitious speculations. His character converted the satire of Pope into fervid praise. Even the dis-

cerning, fastidious, and turbulent Atterbury said, after an interview with him, "So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman." "Lord Bathurst told me, that the Members of the Scriblerus Club being met at his house at dinner, they agreed to rally Berkeley, who was also his guest, on his scheme at Bermudas. Berkeley, having listened to the many lively things they had to say, begged to be heard in his turn, and displayed his plan with such an astonishing and animating force of eloquence and enthusiasm, that they were struck dumb, and after some pause, rose all up together, with earnestness exclaiming, "Let us set out with him immediately." It was when thus beloved and celebrated that he conceived, at the age of forty-five, the design of devoting his life to reclaim and convert the natives of North America; and he employed as much influence and solicitation as common men do for their most prized objects, in obtaining leave to resign his dignities and revenues, to quit his accomplished and affectionate friends, and to bury himself in what must have seemed an intellectual desert. After four years' residence at Newport in Rhode Island, he was compelled, by the refusal of Government to furnish him with funds for his College, to forego his work of heroic, or rather godlike benevolence; though not without some consoling forethought of the fortune of the country where he had sojourned.

"Westward the course of empire takes its way;
The first four acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;
TIME'S NOBLEST OFFSPRING IS ITS LAST."

Thus disappointed in his ambition of keeping a school for savage children, at a salary of a hundred pounds by the year, he was received, on his return, with open arms by the philosophical queen, at whose metaphysical parties he made one with Sherlock, who, as well as Smalridge, was his supporter, and with Hoadley, who, following Clarke, was his antagonist. By her influence he was made bishop of Cloyne.

'Of the exquisite grace and beauty of his diction, no man accustomed to English composition can need to be informed. His works are, beyond dispute, the finest models of philosophical style since Cicero. Perhaps they surpass those of the orator, in the wonderful art by which the fullest light is thrown on the most minute and evanescent parts of the most subtle of human conceptions. Perhaps he also surpassed Cicero in the charm of simplicity, a quality eminently found in Irish writers before the end

of the eighteenth century ; conspicuous in the masculine severity of Swift, in the Platonic fancy of Berkeley, in the native tenderness and elegance of Goldsmith, and not withholding its attractions from Hutcheson and Leland, writers of classical taste, though of inferior power. The two Irish philosophers of the eighteenth century may be said to have co-operated in calling forth the metaphysical genius of Scotland ; for though Hutcheson spread the taste, and furnished the principles, yet Berkeley undoubtedly produced the scepticism of Hume, which stimulated the instinctive school to activity, and was thought incapable of confutation, otherwise than by their doctrines.'

Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, Hartley and Paley are successively treated at considerable length, and in a very interesting way. The mere mention of their names will be sufficient to prepare the intelligent reader for the rich entertainment, which he will derive from Sir James's account of them. In his observations on the errors of Hume, Hartley and Paley, he is perhaps rather too lenient ; but he shows no disposition to adopt them, and charity towards opponents is so rare a quality in controversy, that we can hardly bring ourselves to blame it even in its excess. We quote from the remarks on Abraham Tucker, the eccentric author of '*The Light of Nature Pursued*, by Edward Search, 'the following passage.

'It has been the remarkable fortune of this writer to have been more prized by the cultivators of the same subjects, and more disregarded by the generality even of those who read books on such matters, than perhaps any other philosopher. He had many of the qualities which might be expected in an affluent country gentleman, living in a privacy undisturbed by political zeal, and with a leisure unbroken by the calls of a profession, at a time when England had not entirely renounced her old taste for metaphysical speculation. He was naturally endowed, not indeed with more than ordinary acuteness or sensibility, nor with a high degree of reach and range of mind, but with a singular capacity for careful observation and original reflection, and with a fancy perhaps unmatched in producing various and happy illustration. The most observable of his moral qualities appear to have been prudence and cheerfulness, good nature and easy temper. The influence of his situation and character is visible in his writings. Indulging his own tastes and fancies, like most English squires of his time, he became, like many of them, a sort of humorist. Hence much of his originality and independence ; hence the boldness with which he openly employs illustrations from homely

objects. He wrote to please himself more than the public. He had too little regard for readers, either to sacrifice his sincerity to them, or to curb his own prolixity, repetition and egotism, from the fear of fatiguing them. Hence he became as loose, as rambling, and as much an egotist as Montaigne; but not so agreeably so, notwithstanding a considerable resemblance of genius; because he wrote on subjects where disorder and egotism are unseasonable, and for readers whom they disturb instead of amusing. His prolixity at last increased itself, when his work became so long, that repetition in the latter parts partly arose from forgetfulness of the former; and though his freedom from slavish deference to general opinion is very commendable, it must be owned, that his want of a wholesome fear of the public renders the perusal of a work which is extremely interesting, and even amusing in most of its parts, on the whole a laborious task. He was by early education a believer in Christianity, if not by natural character religious. His calm good sense and accommodating temper led him rather to explain established doctrines in a manner agreeable to his philosophy, than to assail them. Hence he was represented as a time-server by free-thinkers, and as a heretic by the orthodox. Living in a country, where the secure tranquillity flowing from the Revolution was gradually drawing forth all mental activity towards practical pursuits and outward objects, he hastened from the rudiments of mental and moral philosophy, to those branches of it which touch the business of men. Had he recast without changing his thoughts,—had he detached those ethical observations for which he had so peculiar a vocation, from the disputes of his country and his day,—he might have thrown many of his chapters into their proper form of essays, which might have been compared, though not likened, to those of Hume. But the country gentleman, philosophic as he was, had too much fondness for his own humors to engage in a course of drudgery and deference. It may, however, be confidently added, on the authority of all those who have fairly made the experiment, that whoever, unfettered by a previous system, undertakes the labor necessary to discover and relish the high excellencies of this metaphysical Montaigne, will find his toil lightened as he proceeds, by a growing indulgence, if not partiality, for the foibles of the humorist; and at last rewarded, in a greater degree perhaps than by any other writer on mixed and applied philosophy, by being led to commanding stations and new points of view, whence the mind of a moralist can hardly fail to catch some fresh prospects of nature and duty.

The articles on Bentham, Stewart and Brown are the longest and most elaborate in the work. They will amply

reward the closest attention. The following remarks on the style of Stewart are equally just and beautiful. They furnish the charming spectacle of one master in the art of eloquence, enlarging with nice discrimination, and at the same time with a full and hearty good will, upon the kindred excellence of another. Such criticism not only improves the taste, but warms, exalts and mends the heart.

‘Probably no modern ever exceeded him in that species of eloquence, which springs from sensibility to literary beauty and moral excellence; which neither obscures science by prodigal ornament, nor disturbs the serenity of patient attention; but though it rather calms and soothes the feelings, yet exalts the genius, and insensibly inspires a reasonable enthusiasm for whatever is good and fair.

‘Amidst excellencies of the highest order, his writings, it must be confessed, leave some room for criticism. He took precautions against offence to the feelings of his contemporaries, more anxious and frequent than the impatient searcher for truth may deem necessary. For the sake of promoting the favorable reception of philosophy itself, he studies perhaps too visibly to avoid whatever might raise up prejudices against it. His gratitude and native modesty dictated a superabundant care in softening and excusing his dissent from those who had been his own instructors, or who were the objects of general reverence. Exposed by his station, both to the assaults of political prejudice, and to the religious animosities of a country where a few sceptics attacked the slumbering zeal of a Calvinistic people, it would have been wonderful if he had not betrayed more wariness than would have been necessary or becoming in a very different position. The fullness of his literature seduced him too much into multiplied illustrations. Too many of the expedients happily used to allure the young may unnecessarily swell his volumes. Perhaps a successive publication in separate parts made him more voluminous than he would have been, if the whole had been at once before his eyes. A peculiar susceptibility and delicacy of taste produced forms of expression, in themselves extremely beautiful, but of which the habitual use is not easily reconcilable with the condensation desirable in works necessarily so extensive. If, however, it must be owned that the caution incident to his temper, his feelings, his philosophy and his station, has somewhat lengthened his composition, it is not less true, that some of the same circumstances have contributed towards those peculiar beauties, which place him at the head of the most adorned writers on philosophy in our language.

‘ Few writers rise with more grace from a plain ground-work, to the passages which require greater animation or embellishment. He gives to narrative, according to the precept of Bacon, the color of the time, by a selection of happy expressions from original writers. Among the secret arts by which he diffuses elegance over his diction, may be remarked the skill which, by deepening or brightening a shade in a secondary term, by opening partial or preparatory glimpses of a thought to be afterwards unfolded, unobservedly heightens the import of a word, and gives it a new meaning, without any offence against old use. It is in this manner that philosophical originality may be reconciled to purity and stability of speech,—that we may avoid new terms, which are the easy resource of the unskilful or the indolent, and often a characteristic mark of writers who love their language too little to feel its peculiar excellencies, or to study the art of calling forth its powers.

‘ He reminds us not unfrequently of the character given by Cicero to one of his contemporaries, “ who expressed refined and abstruse thought, in soft and transparent diction.” His writings are a proof that the mild sentiments have their eloquence as well as the vehement passions. It would be difficult to name works in which so much refined philosophy is joined with so fine a fancy,—so much elegant literature, with such a delicate perception of the distinguishing excellencies of great writers, and with an estimate in general so just of the services rendered to knowledge by a succession of philosophers. They are pervaded by a philosophical benevolence, which keeps up the ardor of his genius, without disturbing the serenity of his mind,—which is felt in his reverence for knowledge, in the generosity of his praise, and in the tenderness of his censure. It is still more sensible in the general tone with which he relates the successful progress of the human understanding, among many formidable enemies. Those readers are not to be envied who limit their admiration to particular parts, or to excellencies merely literary, without being warmed by the glow of that honest triumph in the advancement of knowledge, and of that assured faith in the final prevalence of truth and justice, which breathe through every page of them, and give the unity and dignity of a moral purpose to the whole of these classical works.

‘ He has often quoted poetical passages, of which some throw much light on our mental operations. If he sometimes prized the moral common-places of Thomson and the speculative fancy of Akenside more highly than the higher poetry of their betters, it was not to be wondered at that the metaphysician and the moralist should sometimes prevail over the lover of poetry. His

natural sensibility was perhaps occasionally cramped by the cold criticism of an unpoetical age ; and some of his remarks may be thought to indicate a more constant and exclusive regard to diction, than is agreeable to the men of a generation who have been trained by tremendous events to a passion for daring inventions, and to an irregular enthusiasm, impatient of minute elegancies and refinement. Many of those beauties, which his generous criticism delighted to magnify in the works of his contemporaries, have already faded under the scorching rays of a fiercer sun.'

In the concluding section of the work, Sir James states at some length his own views on the theory of moral science, which are more concisely intimated in several preceding passages. They are summarily recapitulated by himself in the following terms. 'Whatever actions and dispositions are approved by *Conscience*, acquire the name of virtues or duties ; they are pronounced to deserve commendation ; and we are justly considered as under a moral *obligation* to practise the action, and cultivate the dispositions.' In other words, we possess a distinct and separate Moral Faculty called Conscience, by which we take cognizance of moral distinctions ; the characteristics of virtue and vice are, that they are the objects respectively of the favorable and unfavorable decisions of this Faculty, and these decisions we are under an obligation to obey. The nature of this obligation, Sir James nowhere precisely explains. These principles are not new, nor are they, we believe, supported in the present work by any original arguments. They are substantially the same with those of Stewart, and having had occasion to state our views respecting them somewhat at length in our examination of the *Essays* of that writer on the *Active and Moral Powers of Man*,* we deem it unnecessary to repeat them here.

There is, however, one important peculiarity in the views of Sir James Mackintosh, which it may be proper to notice. Stewart and most other writers, who adopt the theory of a Moral Sense or Faculty, consider it as a distinct and original part of our constitution, the germ of which, as of all the other principles of our nature, is born with us, and is gradually developed in the progress of our physical and intellectual culture. Mackintosh supposes, on the contrary, that Conscience or the Moral Faculty is not an original part of our constitution, but a 'secondary formation,' created at a later period of life by the effect of the Association of

* N. A. Review. Vol. XXXI. p. 213.

Ideas, out of a variety of elements existing in the mind. If we understand him rightly, the animal appetites are the only original elements of our constitution. By associating the pleasures we derive from the gratification of these with the persons about us who lend us their aid in gratifying them, we gradually acquire Social Feelings. The actions, whether our own or those of others, which tend to gratify the animal appetites and the social feelings thus formed out of them, of course give us pleasure, and are also recognized by the understanding as tending to promote the general good. These and a variety of other impressions that are made upon the mind by the observation of voluntary actions are gradually amalgamated into a new feeling, entirely distinct from any of the elements composing it, to which we give the name of *Moral Approbation*; and the mind, considered as having the capacity to exercise this new feeling in regard to voluntary actions, is said to possess a new and distinct power, which is called the Moral Faculty or Conscience. Such is a brief outline of Sir James's theory, as far as it is peculiar to himself and as we understand his language. We owe it to the reputation and authority of so distinguished a writer, to quote the most important passages in his own words.

‘When the social affections are thus formed, they are naturally followed in every instance by the will to do whatever can promote their object. Compassion excites a voluntary determination to do whatever relieves the person pitied. The like process must occur in every case of gratitude, generosity, and affection. Nothing so uniformly follows the kind disposition as the act of will, because it is the only means by which the benevolent desire can be gratified. The result of what Brown justly calls “a finer analysis,” shows a mental contiguity of the affection to the volition to be much closer than appears on a coarser examination of this part of our nature. No wonder, then, that the strongest association, the most active power of reciprocal suggestion, should subsist between them. As all the affections are delightful, so the volitions, voluntary acts, which are the only means of their gratification, become agreeable objects of contemplation to the mind. The habitual disposition to perform them is felt in ourselves, and observed in others, with satisfaction. As these feelings become more lively, the absence of them may be viewed in ourselves as a pain, in others with an alienation capable of indefinite increase. They become entirely independent sentiments; still, however, receiving constant supplies of nourishment from their parent affections, which, in well-balanced minds, reciprocally strengthen each other; unlike the unkind passions, which are constantly

engaged in the most angry conflicts of civil war. In this state we desire to experience these *beneficent volitions*, to cultivate a disposition towards them, and to do every correspondent voluntary act. They are for their own sake the objects of desire. They thus constitute a large portion of those emotions, desires, and affections, which regard certain dispositions of the mind and determinations of the will as their sole and ultimate end. These are what are called the moral sense, the moral sentiments, or best, though most simply, by the ancient name of *Conscience*; which has the merit, in our language, of being applied to no other purpose, which peculiarly marks the strong working of these feelings on conduct, and which, from its solemn and sacred character, is well adapted to denote the venerable authority of the highest principle of human nature.

‘Nor is this all: It has already been seen that not only sympathy with the sufferer, but indignation against the wrong-doer, contributes a large and important share towards the moral feelings. We are angry at those who disappoint our wish for the happiness of others. We make the resentment of the innocent person wronged our own. Our moderate anger approves all well-proportioned punishment of the wrong-doer. We hence approve those dispositions and actions of voluntary agents which promote such suitable punishment, and disapprove those which hinder its infliction or destroy its effect; at the head of which may be placed that excess of punishment beyond the average feelings of good men, which turns the indignation of the calm by-stander against the culprit into pity. In this state, when anger is duly moderated,—when it is proportioned to the wrong,—when it is detached from personal considerations,—when *dispositions and actions are its ultimate objects*,—it becomes a sense of justice, and is so purified as to be fitted to be a new element of conscience. There is no part of morality which is so *directly* aided by a conviction of the necessity of its observance to the general interest, as justice. The connexion between them is discoverable by the most common understanding. All public deliberations profess the public welfare to be their object; all laws propose it as their end. This calm principle of public utility serves to mediate between the sometimes repugnant feelings which arise in the punishment of criminals, by repressing undue pity on one hand, and reducing resentment to its proper level on the other. Hence the unspeakable importance of criminal laws, as a part of the moral education of mankind. Whenever they carefully conform to the moral sentiments of the age and country,—when they are withheld from approaching the limits within which the disapprobation of good men would confine punishment, they contribute in the highest degree to increase the ignominy of crimes, to make men

recoil from the first suggestions of criminality, and to nourish and mature the sense of justice, which lends new vigor to the conscience with which it has been united.

‘Other contributory streams present themselves. Qualities which are necessary to virtue, but may be subservient to vice, may, independently of that excellence or of that defect, be in themselves admirable. Courage, energy, decision, are of this nature. In their wild state, they are often savage and destructive. When they are tamed by the society of the affections, and trained up in obedience to the moral faculty, they become virtues of the highest order, and, by their name of *magnanimity*, proclaim the general sense of mankind that they are the characteristic qualities of a great soul. They retain whatever was admirable in their unreclaimed state, together with all that they borrow from their new associate and their high ruler. Their nature, it must be owned, is prone to evil; but this propensity does not hinder them from being rendered capable of being ministers of good, in a state where the gentler virtues require to be vigorously guarded against the attacks of daring depravity. It is thus that the strength of the well-educated elephant is sometimes employed in vanquishing the fierceness of the tiger, and sometimes used as a means of defence against the shock of his brethren of the same species. The delightful contemplation, however, of these qualities, when purely applied, becomes one of the sentiments of which the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents are the direct and final object. By this resemblance they are associated with the other moral principles, and with them contribute to form Conscience, which, as the master faculty of the soul, levies such large contributions on every province of human nature.

‘It is important, in this point of view, to consider also the moral approbation which is undoubtedly bestowed on *those dispositions and actions of voluntary agents*, which terminate in their own satisfaction, security, and well-being. They have been called duties to ourselves, as absurdly as a regard to our own greatest happiness is called self-love. But it cannot be reasonably doubted, that intemperance, improvidence, timidity, even when considered only in relation to the individual, are not only regretted as imprudent, but blamed as morally wrong. It was excellently observed by Aristotle, that a man is not commended as *temperate*, so long as it costs him efforts of *self-denial* to persevere in the practice of temperance, but only when *he prefers that virtue for its own sake*. He is not meek, nor brave, as long as the most vigorous self-command is necessary to bridle his anger or his fear. On the same principle, he may be judicious or prudent; but he is not benevolent, if he confers benefits with a view to his own greatest happiness. In like manner, it is ascertained by ex-

perience, that all the masters of science and of art,—that all those who have successfully pursued truth and knowledge,—love them for their own sake, without regard to the generally imaginary dower of interest, or even to the dazzling crown which fame may place on their heads. But it may still be reasonably asked, why these useful qualities are morally improved, and how they become capable of being combined with those public and disinterested sentiments, which principally constitute conscience? The answer is, because they are entirely conversant with volitions and voluntary actions, and in that respect resemble the other constituents of conscience, with which they are thereby fitted to mingle and coalesce. Like those other principles, they may be detached from what is personal and outward, and fixed on the dispositions and actions, which are the only means of promoting their ends. The sequence of these principles and acts of will becomes so frequent, that the association between both may be as firm as in the former cases. All those sentiments of which the final object is a state of the will, become thus intimately and inseparably blended; and of that perfect state of solution (if such words may be allowed) the result is *Conscience*,—the judge and arbiter of human conduct; which, though it does not supersede *ordinary motives* of virtuous feelings and habits, which are the ordinary motives of good actions, yet exercises a lawful authority even over them, and ought to blend with them. Whatsoever actions and dispositions are approved by conscience acquire the name of virtues or duties: they are pronounced to deserve commendation; and we are justly considered as under a moral *obligation* to practise the actions and cultivate the dispositions.’

With all our respect for the character and opinions of Sir James Mackintosh, we are compelled to say that we do not consider his innovations upon the theory of morals held by those of his predecessors with whom he most nearly agrees, as improvements. We cannot but regret that, apparently from a too anxious wish to avoid the unnecessary multiplication of original principles,—he should have diminished the weight and value of his own testimony in favor of the doctrines which he seems to be most anxious to establish. He shows throughout extraordinary zeal in sustaining the reality of disinterested benevolence, and makes this principle in a manner the cardinal point in his doctrine; but when he develops his own views more systematically in the closing chapter, we find, with surprise and not without pain, that this disinterested benevolence is after all only a ‘secondary formation’ out of our animal appetites. He insists, it is true, that ‘the pleasures derived from the gratification of a

self-regarding appetite may become a part of a perfectly disinterested desire ; and that the disinterested nature and absolute independence of the latter are not in the slightest degree impaired by the consideration that it is so formed.' The reader will judge how far this doctrine is in itself plausible, and how far it is sustained by the reasoning with which it is accompanied in the work. For ourselves, we must own, that we cannot regard it as satisfactory. If the mind, in its mature state, possess the quality of disinterested benevolence, which, by admission, is entirely and totally distinct from any animal appetite, why should we hesitate to admit that the germ of this feeling, as well as of the animal appetites, is an original and inherent part of our nature ? Why is it more probable that there should be only one principle, or one set of principles in the mind than two, or more ? It is no doubt unphilosophical to admit more causes, than are necessary to account for the phenomena that are to be explained ; but it is not less unphilosophical to assign different and entirely opposite effects to the same cause, for no other purpose than to diminish the number of original principles. We can understand, though we cannot agree with those who deny the reality of benevolence, and affirm that selfish gratification is the only possible motive of action. The doctrine which admits the reality of benevolence, and yet denies that it is an original principle of our nature, though more agreeable, is much less consistent and plausible as a theory, and, we must own, is entirely beyond our comprehension.

The same objection applies to Sir James's theory of the *Moral Faculty*. If we thought it necessary to admit the existence of a separate power of this kind, we should be much more disposed to regard it as an original principle, than as a secondary formation out of other elements. For ourselves, we do not, as we have stated on the occasion above alluded to, find any sufficient evidence of the existence of a separate *Moral Faculty*, whether Intellectual or Sensitive. By *Conscience* we understand the mind itself,—the GOD WITHIN US,—exercising jurisdiction over our actions and those of others through the medium of the understanding and of the natural affections ; through the agency, in short, of all those distinct elements of our nature which Sir James supposes to be, for this particular purpose, amalgamated into a new and distinct faculty. The two theories are so far the same, as they both suppose that the mind, in making up its judgments on the moral quali-

ties of actions, employs almost all the various faculties belonging to all. Sir James supposes that, for this purpose, all these various faculties are previously amalgamated into a new and independent power. This theory is not to us distinctly intelligible, and of course does not command our assent. We think it much more natural to suppose that the mind, or in other words, the MAN, in applying his different powers of thought and feeling to the consideration of voluntary actions, exercises each of these powers in turn, as he does for all other purposes, and that when his judgment in regard to a particular action is, as may often be the case, the effect of the exercise of several different powers, the combination is seen not in the process but in the result.

With these brief commentaries, we take our leave for the present of this great and good man. The freedom with which we have dissented from his opinions will have satisfied our readers that we are not the slaves of his authority, nor the blind worshippers of his name. His talents and learning, remarkable as they certainly were, were not superior to those of many of his contemporaries, and are not the points in his character which chiefly command our admiration. We dwell upon his life and writings with peculiar satisfaction, because we recognize in him one of the rare instances in which the highest endowments of intellect, graced and set off by every advantage of education and position in the world, are also associated with correct moral principles and generous sentiments. The contemplation of such characters is delightful, and the description of them tends to elevate the standard of conduct and feeling throughout the community. It is on such characters that we would earnestly exhort the ingenuous and aspiring youth of our country to fix their eyes and fasten their affections. Let them learn from others a stricter prudence in private affairs, and a steadier industry,—the secrets of Fortune;—but let them study in Mackintosh the reverence for Religion and Virtue;—the generous but well-tempered zeal for improvement and liberty; the manly independence; the wide and various learning, and the amiable manners, which rendered his great natural gifts an honor and a blessing to mankind. We feel a sincere pleasure in acknowledging, as far as our feeble powers permit, by this imperfect notice, the pleasure and improvement which we have derived from his conversation and writings; and shall be still more gratified, if the opportunity should be afforded us of resuming the subject with fuller materials hereafter.